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ABSTRACT 
 Is public support for military intervention as susceptible to mounting casualties 
and other costs as many in the media, government leaders, and scholars believe when the 
conflicts become prolonged?  During such conflicts, how does public opinion affect 
presidential decision making?  At first glance, it seems that changes in presidential policy 
are influenced by public opinion, but further research indicates that presidents’ concerns 
about public opinion and approval do not always cause changes in their policies.  This is 
due to continued public support for sustained war efforts, despite increasing casualties 
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I. INTRODUCTION—THEORY OF PRESIDENTS, WAR AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will examine whether public support for prolonged military 
intervention is as fragile as the media, government and many scholars believe.  In this 
context, “fragility” refers to susceptibility to mounting casualties and other war costs.  It 
will further determine if presidential policy is affected by declining popular support 
during a prolonged conflict. In times of national crisis, Americans initially tend to “rally 
around the flag” in support of the President.   
Crises are the opposite force, dramatic events capable of moving approval 
away from – sometimes a long way from – equilibrium approval.  In 
situations in which the nation is in peril against external threats, 
particularly, Americans “rally around the flag,” coming to the support of 
the president, standing as the national symbol.1   
This includes support for entering into armed conflict. The literature suggests that 
over time this support wanes and can even shift to opposition to armed conflict despite 
presidential determinations that continued military engagement is in the best interest of 
national security.  “When the president acts for all, he or she can begin to expect approval 
for that action from all. It is very different from … normal politics.  Normalcy will 
always prevail in the long run.  Thus the approval gained from crisis can never be 
expected to last.”2 
This investigation seeks to answer the following specific questions:  Did public 
opinion affect presidential policy in the Vietnam War?  Secondly, has public opinion 
affected presidential policy in the Iraq War?  To address these questions, a study of 
various bodies of knowledge is required.  In Chapter I, the theory of public opinion in 
democracy and how it relates to policymaking will be analyzed.  In Chapter II and III, the 
                                                 
1 James A. Stimson, Tides of Consent:  How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 145. 
2 Stimson, 145. 
2 
 
Vietnam War and Iraq War, respectively, will be looked at with regard to presidential 
policy and public opinion.  These two wars were chosen because they encompassed most 
of President Johnson’s and President Bush’s presidencies, during which time both wars 
were escalated.  Public opinion demonstrates the level of support for the president prior 
to armed conflict, and if war support wanes or grows as the conflict continues.  In 
Chapter IV, the similarities and differences between the two wars will be explained.   
The current inquiry also involves an analysis and discussion of numerous public 
opinion poll data. Gallup Opinion polls and American National Election Study polls will 
be examined to determine the degree of public support for the president’s handling of 
each specific conflict, whether or not the public thought it was a mistake to enter armed 
conflict, and what should happen “next” within the conflict.  Chapter V is a summation, 
conclusion, and recommended future research from the above studies throughout the 
thesis. 
B. IDEAL DEMOCRACY 
In an ideal representative democracy, officials are elected by constituents in their 
particular proportional representation, state and country to represent them and their ideas.  
When it is time for a policymaker to take a position on a particular issue, it is important 
that the policymaker take into account what their constituents want, not their own 
personal or party ideas.  “When a policymaker decides to take a stance or propose a 
particular action, they first try to develop an understanding of constituents’ sentiments, 
either from public opinion polls or from reflections of public opinion through mass media 
content or from other formal means.”3  To further support this stance, J. David Kennamer 
adds, “Normative democratic theory calls for much more serious role for public 
opinion—it is supposed to have something to do with the formation of public policy.”4  
Here the linkage between public opinion and presidential policy and how the president 
                                                 
3 Dan Berkowitz, Public Opinion, The Press, and Public Policy, (Westport:  Praeger Publishers, 1992), 
87–88. 




executes his policy begins.  Conversely, in American democracy, as officials are elected, 
the choices that most policymakers make are based on their respective political party 
affiliation and may not coincide with what their constituent’s desire.   
When a controversial new position is staked out, the “supporters” – those 
who have already advocated the position – will of course join with 
enthusiasm.  And most of those in between will find easier and more 
comfortable to support their party’s new stance than to oppose it.  The cost 
of opposition is estrangement from their party, while going along is 
costless.  The opponents, who, in contrast, will have taken public positions 
– sometimes intense ones, sometimes even winning political support for 
them – will not go along.  For them it is not costless to join their party’s 
position.  They might appear inconsistent and unprincipled and might 
alienate voters they count on for support.5   
During the Vietnam War and Iraq War, most politicians went along with their 
party rather than going along with what their constituents wanted as the war prolonged.   
As long as it was President Johnson’s war, public support for the war was 
generally higher among Democrats than Republicans.  When it became a 
Republican war, Republicans were somewhat inclined to express support 
for the war than were Democrats.6   
Officials sometimes go along with party affiliation for decision making rather 
than constituents’ desires.  Both Presidents Johnson and Bush had strong public support 
polls for military action when they decided to escalate the Vietnam War and invade Iraq, 
respectively.  “American public greeted the escalation in 1965 with approval.”7  Likewise 
in 2003, “as the war began, news reports announced that Americans rallied around the 
president.”8 
                                                 
5 Stimson, 65. 
6 Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus:  The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support 
for U.S. Military Operations, (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1996), 87. 
7 Susan A. Brewer, Why America Fights, (New York:  Oxford University Press, Inc., 2009), 194. 
8 Brewer, 251. 
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C. PUBLIC OPINION 
The earliest known opinion poll in the United States was in 1824 by The 
Harrisburg Pennsylvanian. The locally conducted straw poll, an unofficial vote used to 
ascertain public opinion and predict the outcome of an official vote, showed Andrew 
Jackson leading John Quincy Adams for the presidency of the United States 335 votes to 
169.9  Although President Adams won the election, this example shows a case of 
Congress acting congruently with party desires and against more popular will.  The 
debate on whether public opinion affects policy began when the first public opinion polls 
were taken and released.  Over time, with regard to public opinion and policy, compelling 
arguments have developed on both sides.  One side takes the stance that public opinion 
does shape presidential policy and the other that it does not.  The initial focus is on those 
who say public opinion does affect presidential policy, and the later focus on the 
naysayers.  “Normative expectations that mass publics should exist and should have 
policy input persist… and play a critical role in not how policy is determined, than at 
least how it is justified.”10  The public’s opinion does have a voice in American 
democracy.  It may come at the beginning of the decision making or after the decision 
has been made.  Kennamer boldly states, “Voting is the most visible and concrete sign of 
public opinion.”11  According to Erikson, Wright, & McIver, “in national studies, public 
opinion (and its expression through the electoral process) is frequently of central concern 
in explaining the process of policy development and change over time…the persuasive 
attention to the connections between public preferences and the actions of government on 
the part of scholars of national politics is not in the least surprising.”12  In later chapters, 
polls will show as the Vietnam and Iraq Wars prolonged, if public opinion further shaped 
presidential policy.   
                                                 
9 Wikipedia, “Opinion Poll,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_poll. 
10 Kennamer, 15. 
11 Kennamer, 2. 
12 Robert S. Erikson, John P. McIver, and Gerald C. Wright, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion 
and Policy in the American States (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5. 
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During elections, wars and major economic changes in the United States, public 
opinion can influence perceptions of what direction the country should head and thus 
affect presidential policy.  “Public opinion may set the outside limits beyond which 
policymakers cannot go, but within those limits it is quite uninvolved.”13  Once a 
policymaker has an idea of where public opinion stands regarding a certain issue, he or 
she can operate within those limits and sometimes even push the envelope in some cases.  
Elected officials have to be careful when taking their positions, they could either lose or 
gain support from their constituents depending on how their position affects their 
supporters.  “Potentially two effects public opinion can have on public policy: effects on 
the process of policymaking and the effects on the actual policy choice.”14  If the public 
is not satisfied with the decisions of their elected officials, they can elect someone 
different into office that is more aligned to their beliefs.  “Elected officials who ignore 
policy issues of importance to the general public, or whose policy actions stray beyond 
the bounds of what the public finds acceptable, will be less likely to stay in office.”15  
When the public feels ignored, or if elected officials stray beyond the limits of public 
opinion, the public tends to elect someone else who is more closely aligned with their 
ideals. 
D. NAYSAYERS  
There is a minority of authors who argue that there is little to no link between 
presidential policy and public opinion.  J.E Brooks focuses on the link between these two 
distinct groups.  “There is little if any direct relationship between “mass public opinion” 
and governmental policy in Western democracies… If the preferences of “mass publics” 
do not seem to register in policy, then whose “wants, needs, and demands” are 
transmitted to policymakers and incorporated in policymaking?”16  He further argues that 
                                                 
13 Kennamer, 3. 
14 Kennamer, 13. 
15 David Pritchard, Public Opinion, The Press, and Public Policy, (Westport:  Praeger Publishers, 
1992), 107. 
16 Kennamer, 2. 
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the majority of the public do not keep up with the day–to–day agendas of policymakers 
and public opinion polls show how ignorant the public is about these issues.   
The difficulties and activities of everyday life command attention in ways 
that politics rarely, ever does.  It is therefore warranted to expect most 
people most of the time to be absorbed in the minutiae of politics and 
public policy unless these intrude in a very direct way on their everyday 
lives.  Indeed, it seems that studies of the public knowledge of such topics 
turn out to be studies of their lack of knowledge.”17 
Another argument is that public opinion is media–influenced.  “People seek out 
the media that conform to their views, demonstrating a confirmation bias, the tendency to 
seek out, interpret, and create information that verifies ones existing beliefs.”18 If a 
person is a conservative, they would be more inclined to have those views of other like–
minded conservatives and watch particular news channels that cater to their views.  The 
same would hold true for a liberal person.  “We regularly argue along partisan and 
ideological lines about media slant toward one or the other side in American politics.  But 
arguments about slant miss the important action…It is quite wrong to assume all issues 
get two–sided treatment.  There are many matters where one side is dominant and is the 
only message the public hears.”19  This allows for the public to be skewed in one 
direction or the other when pollsters call the public looking for a non–biased opinion. 
Another example naysayers argue is loyalty to political parties.  It is clear in both 
wars how party loyalty overshadowed public opinion and what the consequences were 
during an election year.  Elected officials typically align with the ideals of their affiliated 
party rather than the interests of their constituents; this echoes the truth about the role of 
public opinion in politics and policy.   
 
 
                                                 
17 Kennamer, 3. 
18 D.L. Rosenhan, “On Being Sane in Insane Places.” Science, (1973), 179, 250–258. 
19 Stimson, 17. 
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II. VIETNAM WAR 
1954 21–Jul Geneva accords end Indochina war between French and Communist–led guerrillas 
  8–Sep South East Asia Treaty Organization created 
  23–Oct President Eisenhower offers aid to South Vietnamese government 
1955 12–Feb United States advisers take over training of South Vietnamese army from French 
  23–Oct Diem becomes president of South Vietnam 
1958   Growth of Viet Cong guerrilla war against government of South Vietnam 
1960 8–Nov South Vietnamese government charges North Vietnam is infiltrating troops into South Vietnam 
  10–Nov Revolt of South Vietnamese paratroopers against Diem fails 
1961 Fall Decision by Kennedy Administration to increase military and economic aid to South Vietnam,  
    raise numbers of military advisers from 685 to several thousands 
1962 9–Oct Diem says war against Viet Cong now going well 
1963 2–Oct Defense Secretary McNamara predicts most of the 14,000 United States military personnel in 
    South Vietnam can be withdrawn by the end of 1965 
  1–Nov After months of internal political and religious turmoil, Diem ousted from office and killed in coup 
  22–Nov Kennedy assassinated;  Johnson becomes president 
  23–Nov McNamara abandons plan to withdraw by end of 1965, notes gains of Viet Cong after Diem coup 
1964 30–Jan Another coup in South Vietnam 
  17–Mar United States pledge of continued assistance to South Vietnam as long as required to control 
    "Communist aggression";  warnings to North Vietnam repeatedly issued 
  August In response to two firings on American ships in Gulf of Tonkin, North Vietnamese PT boat bases are  
    bombed;  Congress passes resolution supporting action and other such measures to protect 
    United States forces and "prevent further aggression" 
  3–Nov Johnson re–elected president 
1965 27–Jan Coup in South Vietnam after months of political and religious turmoil 
  7–Feb North Vietnam bombed by United States planes in retaliation for Viet Cong attack on United States 
    bases in South Vietnam 
  16–Feb Coup in South Vietnam 
  24–Feb United States planes bomb Viet Cong targets in South Vietnam for first time 
  27–Feb State Department White Paper on aggression from the North 
  8–Mar Marines land in South Vietnam to defend United States base 
  21–Mar Communist China says it will fight in Vietnam if United States invades the North or if aid is requested 
    by the North Vietnamese 
  2–Apr United States to increase troops in South Vietnam, increase air strikes 
  17–Apr 15,000 demonstrators in Washington protest bombings;  teach–ins follow 
  May Five–day suspension of air raids 
  21–Jun Ky becomes premier of South Vietnam 
  28–Jul Johnson announces increased draft calls to allow buildup in Vietnam from current 75,000 to 125,000 
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  23–Sep North Vietnam reaffirms earlier rejections of United States offers to negotiate 
  30–Sep Attempted coup by Communists in Indonesia fails, leads to massive anti–Communist movement there 
  24–Dec Month–long bombing halt begins 
1966 February Senate hearings on war in Vietnam 
  Spring Many antiwar demonstrations 
  12–Apr First B–52 raids over North Vietnam 
  May 
Rise of Lin Piao in China;  beginnings of purges, Red Guard movement, Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution 
  29–Jun Extension of bombing raids to oil dumps near Hanoi 
  11–Sep Elections in Vietnam for constituent assembly 
  December Reports from North Vietnam by New York Times correspondent on civilian damage caused by United States 
    air strikes 
1967 February 
Wilson–Kosygin probes for negotiations on war; North Vietnam continues to demand unconditional 
bombing  
    halt before talks can begin 
  15–Apr Mass antiwar rally of 100,000 in New York 
  3–Sep Elections of Thieu and Ky in South Vietnam 
  21–Oct Antiwar demonstrators storm Pentagon 
  November Bunker–Westmoreland visit to United States, voice optimism on war 
1968 30–Jan Beginning of major offensive by Communists during Tet cease–fire 
  28–Feb Military requests 206,000 more men 
  1–Mar McCarthy gets sizeable vote in challenge to president in New Hampshire primary 
  22–Mar General Westmoreland removed as commander in Vietnam and promoted 
  31–Mar Johnson declares partial bombing halt, calls for talks, announces he will not run for re–election 
  3–Apr North Vietnam agrees to preliminary peace talks 
  9–Apr 
Defense Secretary Clifford announces policy of 549,500 troop ceiling and gradual transfer of war 
responsibility 
    to South Vietnamese 
  Spring Many antiwar demonstrations 
  May Further Communist offensives 
  8–Aug Nixon nominated by Republicans 
  29–Aug Humphrey nominated by Democrats at tempestuous convention 
  31–Oct Full bombing halt agreed to, 'productive discussions" to be begun 
  6–Nov Nixon elected President 
1969 Spring Communist offensives 
  8–Jun Nixon announces beginning of troop withdrawals:  25,000 by August 
  3–Sep President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam dies 
  16–Sep Nixon announces withdrawals of 35,000 more men as pace of war slackens 
  October Nationwide protests against the war (moratorium) 
  15–Nov Mass antiwar march in Washington of 250,000 to 300,00 
  16–Nov Reports of civilian massacre by United States troops in March 1968 at Mylai 
9 
 
  15–Dec Nixon announces further withdrawal of 50,000 
1970 20–Apr Nixon pledges to withdraw 150,000 troops over the next year 
  May Joint United States–South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia;  massive protest in the United States 
1971 February South Vietnamese troops, with United States support, invade Laos 
  Spring Trial and conviction of Lt. Calley for mass murder at Mylai 
  13–Jun New York Times begins its controversial publication of the "Pentagon Papers" 
  October Reelection of Thieu 
  December Series of bombing raids on North Vietnam 
1972 23–Mar United States declares indefinite suspension of Paris peace talks 
  April Major Communist offensive; United States resumes massive bombing of North Vietnam 
  July Peace talks resume;  one battalion remains as the only American combat unit in South Vietnam 
Table 1.   Vietnam Timeline 
Source: War, Presidents, and Public Opinion 
 
A. RALLYING SUPPORT 1964–1966 
From the Vietnam timeline (Table 1), it can be seen that U.S. forces, at first in 
small numbers, had been in Vietnam since 1955.  Troop strength increased minimally 
until President Johnson came into office.  It was not until after the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution of 1964, which allowed for additional troops to protect U.S. forces and 
prevent further aggression, that troop strength began to increase significantly.  
Considering polls from 1964, when asked, “Do you think the U.S. is handling affairs in 
South Vietnam as well as could be expected, or do you think we are handling affairs there 
badly?”20  Americans who thought affairs were being handled badly slightly outweighed 
those who thought they were going as well as expected by one to three percentage points 
prior to August 1964.  That month, Americans who thought affairs were being handled 
well shot up to 72 percent and those who thought affairs were going badly was down to 
16 percent.  Shortly afterward, the numbers decreased to 51 and 23 percent respectively.  
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed in August, which could explain why the 
proportion of Americans that thought affairs were being handled properly spiked so high.  
Yet, Americans did not “rally around the flag” until 1965.  Another question being asked 
                                                 
20 Gallup Opinion Polls, 1964. 
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in 1964, “What do you think should be next in Vietnam?”  The most popular choice was 
to remain with the present policy, keep watching, and keep troops in Vietnam.  The next 
popular answer was to get tough and apply more pressure.  According to the NES 
surveys, most Americans wanted to invade North Vietnam if we had to.  Though those 
were the popular choices, the majority of Americans did not have an idea about what to 
do in 1964 as Tables 2, 3, and 4 show  The Gallup Poll also shows that President Johnson 
kept a mid-70 percent overall approval rating for the most of the year, and dropped as 
low in 68 in November 1968. 
To rally public support, President Johnson continued to use arguments to persuade 
the American people to support Vietnam, which were also used in the Korean War.  Such 
arguments included the containment of communism, the “domino effect” of communism, 
and how isolationism was a popular choice during World War II, yet the United States 
still fought in the war.  The first two arguments were effective for the President and he 
used them time and time again throughout the war.  Each argument added justification to 
his efforts to escalate and maintain the war.  “The principal reasons that lay behind 
continued support for the war were the containment of Communism, U.S. credibility, and 
strengthening resolve of others to resist communism.” 21  The idea of domino theory 
came from President Eisenhower in 1954.  “Vietnam and the other noncommunist nations 
of Asia stood like a row of dominoes…if one fell to communism, the rest would 
topple.”22  President Johnson’s argument using anti–isolationism was far–fetched, but 
effective early on.  “Johnson liked to cite favorable opinion polls, which discouraged 
other politicians from expressing criticism.  ‘Popular support and sound policy are 
obviously not the same thing,’ pointed out New York Times columnist James Reston, as 
he reminded readers that isolationism in the years before World War II had been a 
popular policy at the time.”23   
 
                                                 
21 Larson, 25. 
22 Brewer, 183. 





Table 2.   U.S. Handling Affairs in South Vietnam in 1964 























Figure 1.   U.S. Handling Affairs in South Vietnam in 1964 










Table 3.   What to do Next in Vietnam? 1964 




Table 4.   Did U.S. Do Right Thing in Vietnam and What U.S. Should Do Now? 













Table 5.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1964 
Source: Gallup Poll 1964 
 
 
Figure 2.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1964 




In 1965, Tables 5 and 9 show that approval for President Johnson’s handling of 
the war increased from 1964.  Approval remained in the mid-50 percent range throughout 
the year and disapproval remained in the mid-20 percent.  Meanwhile, President 
Johnson’s overall approval began at 70 percent and slowly declined to nearly 60 percent 
by years end.  There were some major events in South Vietnam that some felt should 
have hurt the public’s approval for the President’s handling of the war, but did not.  In 
January 1965, there was a coup after political and religious turmoil, in February another 
coup followed, Marines were sent into South Vietnam to defend U.S. bases, U.S. air 
forces began bombing Viet Cong targets, and troop strength increased.  “Re–elected by a 
landslide in November 1964, LBJ went ahead with escalation.  In early 1965, he ordered 
Operation Rolling Thunder, a controlled bombing attack on North Vietnam’s industry 
and infrastructure.”24  Furthermore, the public supported this escalation providing 
support for the “rally around the flag” phenomenon.  Brewer states, “The American 
Public greeted the escalation in 1965 with approval but seemed confused about its 
purpose.  The solution was to place the cumbersome explanation of U.S. policy in 
Vietnam within the Cold War framework of a showdown between freedom and 
Communism.”25   
With all these events, the lowest level Presidential approval rating for the war to 
date was 48 percent in January and his highest was in September at 57 percent, while his 
highest overall approval was 70 percent and his lowest was 59 percent by years end.  This 
amount of support is a clear indication of Americans seeming to “rally around the flag” 
for the President.  “Support for the war in Vietnam rose quite considerably during the last 
half of 1965.  There seems, therefore, to have been at the time a fairly considerable 
‘rally–round–the–flag’ effect.”26  The question of whether one thought it was a mistake 
                                                 
24 Brewer, 193. 
25 Brewer, 194. 




to send troops to Vietnam was introduced in August 1965 from the Gallup Poll.   With 
just one sampling that year, only about 24 percent of Americans thought is was a mistake, 
while over 60 percent thought it was not.  Over the next years this question was 
repeatedly asked.  Another question asked in 1965, “What would you like to see next in 
Vietnam?”  Johnson’s number were high in his approval for handling Vietnam, thus the 
data would suggest that Americans would want escalation.  The most popular answer was 
almost a third of Americans did not know what to do in Vietnam.  Those who favored 
some action chose to continue present policy, withdraw troops, or escalate the war and 
get it over with.  Approximately a quarter of Americans were also willing to start 
negotiations with North Vietnam in this same poll.  The key idea to take away from 1965 
is that with these escalations almost a third of Americans did not know what action 
should be taken. 
 
Figure 3.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1965 







Table 6.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1965 





Table 7.   Do You Think U.S. Made a Mistake to Send Troops to Vietnam? 1965 





Table 8.   What Would You Like to See Next In Vietnam? 1965 


















Figure 4.   What Would You Like to See Next In Vietnam?  1965 























Table 9.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1965 





Table 10.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1965 
Source: Gallup Poll 1965 
 
2. 1966 
In 1966, the conflict was gradually escalated, unlike the two previous years.  
Anti–war protests increased throughout the year and U.S. air forces began bombing raids 
in North Vietnam.  President Johnson’s approval ratings for the war remained high until 
May of 1966, and his overall approval continued to decline throughout the year.  His 
approval rating for the war began to slowly decline each month until it dropped below 40 
percent, while his disapproval rating for the war increased and surpassed his approval 
rating in June of 1966.  During the remainder of the year, President Johnson’s approval 
rating for the war teetered back and forth in the low 40 percent.  From this point to 1968, 
President Johnson was never able to regain the approval rating he had the previous two 
years.  Meanwhile, the Gallup Poll question on whether it was a mistake to send troops to 
fight in Vietnam did not seem to rattle Americans.  Those Americans who thought it was 
mistake increased from 25 percent in March to 36 percent in May and then declined to 30 
percent in November.  Americans who thought it was not a mistake during the same 
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period declined from 58 percent to 48 percent and increased again to 51 percent.  The 
NES surveys taken in 1966 still had over 35 percent of Americans saying we should keep 
our present policy or take a stronger stance, even if it meant invading North Vietnam.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1966 























Table 11.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1966 









Table 12.   Do You Think U.S. Made a Mistake to Send Troops to Vietnam? 1966 






Table 13.   Did We Do the Right Thing in Vietnam and What Should be Done Now? 1966 





Table 14.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1966 
Source: Gallup Poll 1966 
 
 
Figure 6.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1966 
Source: Gallup Poll 1966 
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3. Presidential Strategy 
President Johnson had high approval ratings for the way he handled the Vietnam 
War early on.  His administration’s strategy to promote the war was very low key as not 
to mobilize the mass populace.  It remained low key until President Johnson wanted more 
troops and anti–war protests began to get larger in numbers and gain more attention.  “To 
sell the unsellable, officials carried out what Walt W. Rostow at the State Department 
called in 1964 a ‘low–key campaign of public information’ designed to generate enough 
home front support without mobilizing the population.”27  Because a small number of 
Americans were aware of the situation in Vietnam, President Johnson wanted to keep that 
number as low as possible.  “Aware that according to polls 63 percent of Americans paid 
little or no attention to Vietnam, the administration wanted to keep it that way.”28  
B. TURN OF THE TIDE IN SUPPORT 1967–1968 
1. 1967 
In 1967, President Johnson’s approval for handling Vietnam started below 40 
percent and his disapproval rating started at 42 percent.  In April and June, the numbers 
were fairly equal to each other and his approval never surpassed his disapproval for the 
rest of the war.  His highest approval rating was 43 percent in April of 1967 and his 
lowest was 26 percent in August of 1966, 8 months earlier.  President Johnson’s overall 
approval rating rebounded from 1966, and remained near mid-40 percent until late June 
1967, when it rebounded to over 50 percent.  It quickly shot down below 40 percent a 
month later and rose again to over 40 percent by the end of the year.  In regards to the 
question if sending troops was a mistake, Table 11 shows the number of Americans who 
thought it was a mistake increased as the year continued and for those who thought that 
the war was not a mistake, those numbers dropped.  “In years following mid–1966, 
support for the war suffers a slow and somewhat ambiguous decline while opposition 
                                                 
27 Brewer, 180. 
28 Mueller, 35. 
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grew at a slightly faster rate.”29  From Table 9, John Mueller’s statement was portrayed 
accurately.  Also while trying to maintain support for the war in Vietnam, his 
administration thought all they had to do was be a little bit more persuasive and they 
would be fine.  “Still, the president and his advisors decided they had to tell a better story.  
‘We must get off the defensive in the propaganda battle,’ urged Johnson’s old friend and 
advisor, Abe Fortas.”30  As 1967 progressed, anti–war rallies became larger and 
demonstrators began to escalate their actions for withdrawal of troops in South Vietnam.   
 
Figure 7.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1967 
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Table 15.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1967 





Table 16.   Do You Think U.S. Made a Mistake to Send Troops to Vietnam? 1967 
Source: Gallup Poll 1967 
 
 
Figure 8.   Do You Think U.S. Made a Mistake to Send Troops to Vietnam? 1967 








Table 17.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1967 
Source: Gallup Poll 1967 
 
 
Figure 9.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1967 




In 1968, the war in Vietnam took center stage in the United States when the North 
Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive against U.S. military bases 
and major cities in South Vietnam.  During this offensive, the media was able to capture 
the war in its rawest form and put those pictures and videos on televisions across 
America and abroad.  In addition to the Tet Offensive, over 200,000 more troops were 
requested.  In February, President Johnson’s overall approval went down to 40 percent, 
and quickly rose to 50 percent two months later.  As a result of Tet, President Johnson 
removed General Westmoreland as commander in Vietnam and announced he would not 
seek re–election for the upcoming year.  Also, because of the Tet Offensive, there is a 
turn in public opinion.  Approval for President Johnson remained low, and those 
Americans who believed it was a mistake to send troops to Vietnam continued to soar in 
numbers.  Another question introduced sporadically in previous years asked if you were a 
“hawk” or “dove.”  A hawk was one who wanted to step up attacks in Vietnam, and a 
dove was one who wanted to use little military involvement.  Prior to Tet, hawks were in 
the upper 50 percent echelon, while doves were in the mid-20 percent.   
The Tet Offensive caused an initial hawkish reaction but that effect was 
revised in a month or two to levels significantly more dovish than 
prevailed in the days before Tet.  With President Johnson’s speech and the 
bombing halt at the end of March 1968, the administration became at leas 
by implication, ‘dovish’ in terms of the poll question and followers.31   
It was not until North Vietnam decided to sit down for peace talks did more 
Americans become doves.  After the U.S. successfully crushed the Viet Cong and pushed 
the North Vietnamese, President Johnson’s approval increased slightly, but was never 
restored to its initial level.  President Johnson had to begin to change his policy in 
Vietnam after Tet and the growing weariness of the American public.   
 
                                                 
31 Mueller, 106. 
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The Tet Offensive, replacement of General Westmoreland, President 
Johnson’s decision not to run again and his partial bombing halt, the 
opening of preliminary peace talks, miscellaneous  offensives in the South, 
and emerging   of explicit challenges to the Johnson policy by prominent 
Democratic candidates these events had little effect for support for the 
war.32 
 In 1968, the turning point in the Vietnam War, support for the President waned 
and Americans still wanted to do more.  Still, when NES surveys were taken later in the 
year over a third of Americans wanted to escalate or continue with the current policy.  
This poll further shows the resolve of the American public, that while they thought it was 
not the right thing to send U.S. troops to Vietnam, they continued to want the same or 
more stringent policy.  The below tables and figures show that during the war Americans 
wanted something to be done.  They did not approve of the way President Johnson 
handled the war, which cost him his presidency. 
.  
Table 18.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1968 
Source: Gallup Poll 1968 
                                                 





Figure 10.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Administration in South Vietnam 1968 




Table 19.   Do You Think U.S. Made a Mistake to Send Troops to Vietnam? 1968 




Figure 11.   Do You Think U.S. Made a Mistake to Send Troops to Vietnam? 1968 
Source: Gallup Poll 1968 
 
 
Table 20.   Are You a “Hawk” or Dove”? 1968 





Figure 12.   Are You a “Hawk” or Dove”? 1968 
Source: Gallup Poll 1968 
 
 
Table 21.   Did We Do the Right Thing in Vietnam and What Should be Done Now?  1968 





Table 22.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1968 
Source: Gallup Poll 1968 
 
Figure 13.   Approve or Disapprove of Johnson Handling Presidency 1968 
Source: Gallup Poll 1968 
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C. CHAPTER II ANALYSIS 
In 1964, the Gallup polls showed that an average of five percent of Americans 
wanted to get out of Vietnam altogether when asked “What to do next in Vietnam?”  In 
the same question, an average of 13 percent of Americans wanted to continue with 
present policy, keeping troops in Vietnam, while an average of 25 percent of Americans 
did not have any comment.  Later in the year, the NES polls posed a similar question 
showing that almost eight percent wanted to pull out of Vietnam entirely, 22 percent 
wanted to keep our soldiers in Vietnam, but try to end the fighting, and 28 percent wanted 
to take a stronger stand, even if it  meant invading North Vietnam.  The following year in 
1965, when the Gallup poll asked “What Would You Like to See Next in Vietnam,” 
Americans were more solidified in their answers.  Approximately eight percent thought 
the U.S. should be more aggressive, while a 14 percent average thought the U.S. should 
continue its present policy.  An average of 13 percent thought that the U.S. should 
withdraw troops and an average of 16 percent wanted to start negotiations and 31 percent 
of Americans did not know what should be next in Vietnam.  In regards to Americans 
who had an opinion about Vietnam, most Americans showed their willingness to fight 
and not want to pack up and leave. 
In 1966, NES polls posed the question “What Should be Done Now?”  Nine 
percent of Americans wanted to pull out of Vietnam entirely, while 35 percent of 
Americans wanted to keep soldiers in Vietnam and try to end the fighting, and another 35 
percent of Americans wanted to take an even stronger stance, even if it meant invading 
North Vietnam.  This means that 70 percent of Americans wanted to stay and/or escalate 
the war during this time period.  When asked which policy Americans preferred in late 
1966 and 1967, nearly 50 percent of Americans wanted to increase its strength of attacks 
in the North, while a third of Americans felt the U.S. should withdraw.  These numbers 
show the resiliency of the American public and a lack of fragility during prolonged 
conflict. 
As mentioned earlier, President Johnson’s reasons to escalate the war, was to 
contain Communism and prevent the domino theory from occurring in Southeast Asia.  
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After years of reaching his “rally around the flag” effect in 1965, President Johnson 
continued to have a high overall and handling Vietnam approval rating for the rest of the 
year.  President Johnson’s approval rating remained mostly positive through December of 
1966, nearly two years after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.  However, May and June of 
1966, was the first instance where the President’s disapproval for handling Vietnam 
became the majority opinion amongst Americans polled.  President Johnson’s approval 
increased sporadically, but never surpassed his disapproval for handling the war.  It was 
not until October 1967, when most Americans thought it was a mistake to send troops to 
Vietnam.  Just two months later, by only one percentage point, did more Americans think 
sending troops to Vietnam was not a mistake.  In 1968, the numbers reversed again, and 
for the rest of the year, over 45 percent of Americans thought the United States made a 
mistake to send troops to Vietnam.  After the Tet Offensive in early 1968, the majority of 
Americans wanted to continue stepping up attacks in North Vietnam.  This suggests that 
public opinion is much more robust than commonly held.  Though support waned for 
President Johnson and he announced he was not seeking re–election later that year, the 
majority of Americans wanted to keep on fighting and/or escalate the Vietnam War. 
Though support tapered off for increased attacks in North Vietnam, the public still 
supported the war effort.  The NES polls from 1968 showed that over two–thirds of 
Americans wanted to stay in Iraq.  Broken down, 19 percent of Americans wanted to pull 
out of Vietnam entirely, 36 percent wanted to keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end 
the fighting, and 33 percent wanted to take a stronger stance even if it meant invading 
North Vietnam.  President Johnson stated he had lost the American people, which was a 
contributing factor to him not seeking re–election.  If President Johnson had paid 
attention to the polls, he would have realized the American public was still in his corner, 
even though he had a low approval rating for handling his job as president and his affairs 
in Vietnam.  His perception of public opinion through the media influenced him to reach 
his decision not to run again for President, which was contrary to what was actually being 
recorded.  The data shows Americans are staunch in their resolve, more than many allude 



























































































































































































Table 23.   Iraq War Timeline 
Source: About.com: Middle East Issues, 
http://middleeast.about.com/od/iraq/a/me071209d.htm 
 
A. RALLYING SUPPORT 2002–2003 
1. 2001–March 2003 
Like President Johnson during the Vietnam War, President Bush had to rally the 
American public and sell his argument on why the U.S. should use military force in Iraq.  
President Bush started his campaign shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon.  Shortly afterward, intelligence reports linked al–
Qaeda to the attacks: 
President Bush and his administration strongly implied that there was a 
link between Saddam and the al Qaeda hijackers, despite Osama Bin 
Laden’s contempt for Saddam as the head of a secular state.  Although 
Bush probably knew that the evidence was quite sketchy at best, he used 
the implied link to bolster support for the war with Iraq.33 
Reports from intelligence sources indicated that Saddam Hussein was involved 
with the September 11 attacks. “Polls show that 53 to 70 percent of Americans thought 
that Saddam Hussein was personally behind the attacks and 50 percent thought some of 
that hijackers had been Iraqis.”34  President Bush would not have to work hard to 
convince the American people to go to war with Iraq, unlike his task with the 
international community, which was not easily persuaded.  From Table 14, in January 
2002 President Bush labeled Iraq as part of the “axis of evil” to both the American and 
                                                 
33 James P. Pfiffner, Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq:  British and American 
Perspectives, (College Station: Manchester University Press, 2008), 59–60. 
34 Brewer, 244. 
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international communities during his State of the Union Address.  The Bush 
administration continued to make a case for military intervention in Iraq linking the 
country to terrorism.  In September 2002, President Bush remarked, “The Americans 
must confront an enemy on scattered battlefields from the Philippines to North Africa.  
Terrorist sought to build up a radical Islamic empire from Spain to Indonesia…’and we 
must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror.’”35  Americans continued to 
show their support for military action in Iraq, but some were willing to fight the war 
unilaterally instead of as a coalition.  “64 percent of Americans favored military action 
against Iraq, but only 33 percent approved military action without allies.”36  Shortly after 
those remarks, in October, Congress passed the Iraq War Resolution, giving the President 
the conditional power to use military force in Iraq.  During 2002 and the months leading 
up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, American approval of the way the President 
was handling Iraq and his desire to employ ground troops to remove Saddam Hussein 
from power was over 50 percent.  These numbers show there was a “rally around the 
flag” for the invasion of Iraq.  “The President decided to invade Iraq in order to remove 
Dictator Saddam Hussein from power and to transform the Persian Gulf nation into a 
reliable ally.  Officials came up with many reasons why Americans must fight, designed 
to rally support for a war of choice.”37  Though the President had over 50 percent 
approval for handling the war, his disapproval hovered around 40 percent from October 
2002 to March 2003, showing there was some staunch opposition for the invasion of Iraq. 
In early 2003, the final push for war came from the Bush administration.  Claims 
of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction became the primary reason for invading Iraq.  
Reports of Iraq receiving yellowcake from Niger were announced in January.  The 
arguments for weapons of mass destruction were stronger than those who argued links 
between Saddam Hussein and al–Qaeda.  “But the most compelling arguments to the 
American people were the arguments that the national security of the United States was at 
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risk.  Thus the claims that Saddam’s WMD posed a direct threat were most effective in 
sustaining political support for war.”38  In February, then Secretary of State, Colin Powell 
went before the U.N. Security Council to make the United States’ case before doubtful 
Americans and the international community.  “The White House selected Powell, who 
was, according to polls, the most trusted member of the administration, to make the 
definitive case before the United Nations on February 5, 2003.  The target audience of 
this speech was not just the international community, but also doubtful Americans.”39  
After Secretary Powell’s speech to the U.N., most Americans felt very comfortable and 
trusted the words from Powell’s speech.  “CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found that 79 
percent of Americans thought that the secretary of state had made a ‘strong’ case for 
invading Iraq.”40 The Gallup poll shows that after the Colin Powell’s speech, over 63 
percent of Americans favored sending in ground troops to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  
The polls further show that until the invasion of Iraq, the Americans in favor of sending 
troops remained near 60 percent.  From October 2002 to March 2003, President Bush’s 
overall approval was over 60 percent and before invading Iraq, it declined to just below 
60 percent. 
 
Table 24.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2002–2003 
Source: Gallup Poll 2002–2003 
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Figure 14.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2002–2003 
Source: Gallup Poll 2002–2003 
 
 
Table 25.   Favor or Oppose of Sending Troops to Invade Iraq 2002–2003 







Figure 15.   Favor or Oppose of Sending Troops to Invade Iraq 2002–2003 





Table 26.   Favor or Oppose Military Action Against Iraq 2002 











Table 27.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2002–2003 
Source: Gallup Poll 2002–2003 
 
 
Figure 16.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2002–2003 





On March 17, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq or face 
war.  Two days later, the United States entered war with Iraq under the premise of his 
handling of WMD, “In focusing on WMD as the main reason for war and arguing that 
there was an imminent threat to the United States.”41  U.S. forces moved very swiftly in 
toppling Saddam’s regime.  In less than one month, American forces were tearing down 
statues of Saddam, and on 1 May, President Bush declared that major combat operations 
were over in Iraq and “Mission Accomplished” for American troops.  From the day of the 
invasion to mid–April, President Bush’s approval rating for handling Iraq skyrocketed 
and maintained a level of nearly 70 percent.  Americans who thought Iraq was worth 
going to war over maintained over 65 percent support until mid-April.  Initially, 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld sent retired Lt. General Jay Garner to head the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to rebuild Iraq, and not a month later, 
President Bush replaced Garner and named L. Paul Bremer, as the Coalition Provisional 
Authority to Iraq.  “Rumsfeld sent retired Lt. General Jay Garner to head the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance with the expectation that Garner would 
finish up by the end of the summer.  Within weeks, Washington replaced Garner’s ill–
prepared outfit with the Coalition Provisional Authority led by former diplomat L. Paul 
Bremer III.”42   
After the announcement of Paul Bremer as Coalition Provisional Authority, 
President Bush’s approval rating for the war decreased from 70 percent to upper 50 
percent by July and continued to decrease to upper 40 percent by the end of the year.  The 
decrease in approval may have occurred due to the guerilla warfare that U.S. forces were 
encountering.  From the time line, senior military officials conceded they were in a 
“classic guerilla–type campaign.”  In October 2003, President Bush’s approval rating for 
the war had succumbed to 50 percent of Americans disapproving of his handling for Iraq, 
while only 47 percent approved.  There was a spike in July in his approval, when Uday 
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and Qusay Hussein were killed.  President Bush’s overall approval started near 70 
percent after the invasion and slowly declined throughout the year.  There was a slight 
rebound in October 2003 and then fluctuated for the rest of the year.  Although President 
Bush’s approval rating for the war was down, the majority of Americans still thought Iraq 
was worth going to war over, and that number also increased in July when Uday and 
Qusay Hussein were killed by U.S. forces.  Another question introduced in October 
referenced what should happen next with the troops in Iraq.  From August to December, 
most Americans felt we should either keep the number of troops already there or begin to 
withdraw some troops.  The supporters fluctuated between the two choices, but after 
capturing Saddam Hussein, over 40 percent thought the U.S. should keep the current 
troop level.   
 
Table 28.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2003 





Figure 17.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2003 
Source: Gallup Poll 2003 
 
 
Table 29.   Was Iraq Worth Going to War Over? 2003 









Figure 18.   Was Iraq Worth Going to War Over? 2003 





Table 30.   What Should the U.S. Do Now about U.S. Troops in Iraq? 2003 




Figure 19.   What Should the U.S. Do Now about U.S. Troops in Iraq? 2003 
Source: Gallup Poll 2003 
 
 
Table 31.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2003 





Figure 20.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2003 
Source: Gallup Poll 2003 
 
3. 2004 
President Bush’s overall approval rating began 2004 at 60 percent and declined 
until June 2004 reaching 48 percent, before seesawing the rest of the year.  His approval 
for handling Iraq began 2004 at over 60 percent, which may be due to U.S. troops 
capturing Saddam Hussein in late December 2003.  As the year progressed the numbers 
leveled off and by April more Americans disapproved of President Bush’s handling of 
Iraq, from which he did not recover for the rest of the year.  Most Americans still thought 
it was worth going to war over Iraq until May.  In May, most Americans did not think 
Iraq was worth going to war over.  However, the numbers reverted back for two months, 
reflecting a change to most Americans thinking Iraq was worth going to war over. In  
October, the numbers swapped again.  When asked if one thought it was a mistake to 
send troops to Iraq, most Americans did not think it was a mistake sending troops to Iraq 
for most of the year.  During June and July, most Americans thought it was a mistake.  
Those numbers reverted back, and for the remainder of 2004, most Americans thought it 
was not a mistake to send troops to Iraq.  Throughout 2004, Americans were torn on 
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whether to send more troops, keep the same number of troops, begin withdrawal of some 
troops or withdraw troops completely.  The Gallup poll shows how this question 
fluctuates from survey to survey.  It is important to find correlations between each to see 
why that particular answer was the dominant one. 
In early January 2004, U.S. deaths reached 500, and security was considered 
weak, when four civilian contractors were attacked in Fallujah.  A few days after the 
attack, Shiite cleric Moqtada al–Sadr led an uprising in several cities.   Examining the 
polls after this attack President Bush’s approval rating fell below his disapproval rating, 
yet over 30 percent of Americans felt we should send more troops to Iraq.  After the 
Abu–Ghraib scandal in April, almost 30 percent of Americans thought all troops should 
be withdrawn.  Meanwhile, President Bush’s approval rating declined to 40 percent, his 
lowest of the year.  It is interesting to note that while the U.S. was preparing to hand 
power over to the Iraqi people, more Americans thought it was a mistake to send troops 
into Iraq and thought Iraq was not worth going to war over.  For the rest of the year 
President Bush’s approval rating recovered to over 45 percent, which may coincide with 
his re–election, while the other opinion questions were answered at the same levels for 























Table 32.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2004 
Source: Gallup Poll 2004 
 
 
Figure 21.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2004 









Table 33.   Was Iraq Worth Going to War Over? 2004 




Figure 22.   Was Iraq Worth Going to War Over? 2004 




Figure 23.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2004 




Table 34.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2004 
Source: Gallup Poll 2004 
 
 
Table 35.   What Should the U.S. Do Now about U.S. Troops in Iraq? 2004 





Figure 24.   What Should the U.S. Do Now about U.S. Troops in Iraq? 2004 




Table 36.   Do You Approve or Disapprove of President Bush’s Handling War in Iraq? and 
Do You Think Iraq Was Worth the Cost? 2004 





Table 37.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2004 




Figure 25.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2004 





During the Iraq War, the timeline shows that violence continued to escalate 
throughout the years.  Over 25,000 civilian deaths were reported and over 2,000 U.S. 
soldiers died by October 2005.  There was some progress within the Iraqi Government, 
elections were held for a parliamentary and permanent government and an interim 
constitution was passed in October.    President Bush’s overall approval rating seesawed 
until August 2005 and the difference between his approval and disapproval continued to 
grow for the rest of the year.  His highest rating was 57 percent and his lowest was 36 
percent.  Like his overall approval rating, President Bush’s approvals for the Iraq War 
were still low and the disparity grew further apart.  He began in the lower 50 percent and 
by the end of the year he was near the low 40 percent.  Most Americans thought that 
President Bush did a good job as President overall. The way he handled Iraq, most 
Americans did not regard him as high, and because of the magnitude Iraq, this subject 
would affect his overall approval rating by the time he leaves office.  Polls from 2006, 
2007, and 2008 will show how closely aligned the President’s overall approval and 
approval for Iraq are.  Regarding the question if it was a mistake in sending troops to 
Iraq, initially most Americans thought it was a mistake.  From February to July, most 
Americans thought it was not a mistake, and afterward more Americans continued to 
think that it was mistake to send troops for the rest of the year. The American public 
fluctuated with whether or not Iraq was worth going to war over.  It was not clear until 
April 2005 that most Americans thought Iraq was not worth going to war over.  At this 
time, there is also a clear distinction that Americans did not want to send more troops to 
Iraq, and they were also willing to withdraw troops out of Iraq.  As the year progressed, 
Americans were less inclined to keep troops in Iraq, and they wanted to begin to see 




Figure 26.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2005 




Table 38.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2005 


































Figure 27.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq?  2005 





Table 39.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2005 





Table 40.   Was Iraq Worth Going to War Over? 2005 




Figure 28.   Was Iraq Worth Going to War Over? 2005 











Table 41.   What Should the U.S. Do Now about U.S. Troops in Iraq? 2005 





Figure 29.   What Should the U.S. Do Now about U.S. Troops in Iraq? 2005 





Table 42.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2005 
Source: Gallup Poll 2005 
 
 
Figure 30.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2005 
Source: Gallup Poll 2005 
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B. THE TURNING POINT IN PUBLIC OPINION 
1. 2006 
President Bush continued 2006 with a low approval rating for the war beginning 
with 38 percent in January and finishing the year at a mere 30 percent, while nearly 60 
percent of Americans disapproved.  2006 is clearly the turning point for the war in Iraq.  
Nearly 60 percent of Americans disapproved of the President’s handling of his job as 
President and handling of Iraq for the entire year.  Over half of Americans thought that it 
was a mistake to send troops into Iraq and over one–third of Americans thought we 
should begin to withdraw troops and turnover military control to the Iraqis.  By the end of 
2006, American deaths in Iraq reached 3,000 and deaths of Iraqi civilians for the year 
grew over 16,000.  After Democrats took over the majority of Congress, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned in late 2006.  President Bush’s overall approval was 
the same as his approval for the war.  It did not exceed 43 percent the whole year, and at 
times his approval was near 30 percent.  Table 23 (Iraq Timeline) shows that sectarian 
violence continued to escalate, and although Abu Musab al–Zarqawi, an al–Qaeda leader 
in Iraq, was killed by U.S. forces, public sentiment did not change on Iraq.  2006 also 
welcomed the sentencing and execution of Saddam Hussein, but still the American public 






Table 43.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2006 




Figure 31.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2006 










Figure 32.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq?  2006 





Table 44.   Which Plan Would You Prefer for Troop Withdrawal? 2006 

























Figure 33.   Which Plan Would You Prefer for Troop Withdrawal? 2006 




Table 45.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2006 





Figure 34.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2006 
Source: Gallup Poll 2006 
 
2. 2007 
By January 2007, President Bush’s approval rating for the war was well below 30 
percent when he announced a troop surge in Iraq to quell the violence that was tearing the 
country apart.  Still, as he went about a change in his strategy in Iraq, his approval rating 
for handling Iraq did not reach over 31 percent in 2007.  His overall approval averaged 
near 35 percent the entire year.  There is only a four percent difference between his 
overall approval and approval for handling Iraq, as they become closely aligned to each 
other. Furthermore, nearly two–thirds of Americans thought it was a mistake to send 
troops to Iraq and most Americans wanted troops home within a year time frame.  On 
April 15, 2007 Pentagon officials announced an extension for troop deployments to 15 
months in Iraq and Afghanistan.  After the surge took place, 20 percent of Americans felt 
that the surge was making a difference, while over half felt there was no difference and 
25 percent felt the situation was getting worse.  At the end of the year, over 40 percent 
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felt the surge was making a difference, while less Americans felt the there was no 
difference or that the situation was getting worse.  2007 would also be the deadliest year 
for U.S. troops.  Both Americans and President Bush hoped for the situation in Iraq to get 
better for 2008.   With all these changes over 60 percent of Americans wanted to either 
withdraw all troops within 12 months or withdraw troops in as many years as needed to 
turnover control to Iraqis.  Though the public did not approve of President Bush, they 




Table 46.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2007 





Table 47.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2007 





Figure 35.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2007 





Table 48.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2007 
Source: Gallup Poll 2007 
 
 
Figure 36.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2007 





Table 49.   Which Plan Would You Prefer for Troop Withdrawal? 2007 























Figure 37.   Which Plan Would You Prefer for Troop Withdrawal? 2007 




Table 50.   Is Troop Surge Making a Difference? 2007 





Figure 38.   Is Troop Surge Making a Difference? 2007 





Table 51.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2007 





Figure 39.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2007 
Source: Gallup Poll 2007 
 
3. 2008 
President Bush’s approval ratings did not fare well in 2008 either.  He began the 
year with an overall approval rating of 33 percent and finished the year at 29 percent.  
There was only one month when polls asked, if you approve or disapprove of President 
Bush’s handling of Iraq?  66 percent of Americans disapproved.  The surge was in full 
swing, yet nearly 60 percent of Americans continued to think that it was a mistake to 
send troops into Iraq.  Through July, over 40 percent of Americans thought the surge was 
making conditions better.  By the end of 2008, both his approval for handling his job as 
President and Iraq were almost at the same level.  From Table’s 50 and 53, the increase in 
support for those Americans who thought the surge was making the situation better in 





Table 52.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2008 





Figure 40.   Was it a Mistake to Send Troops to Iraq? 2008 





Table 53.   Is Troop Surge Making a Difference? 2008 




Figure 41.   Is Troop Surge Making a Difference? 2008 





Table 54.   Approve or Disapprove of President Bush in Iraq 2008 





Table 55.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2008 




Figure 42.   Approve or Disapprove of Bush Handling Job as President 2008 
Source: Gallup Poll 2008 
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C. CHAPTER III ANALYSIS 
 President Bush’s approval rating for Iraq was positive through September of 
2003, six months after invading Iraq.  However, his overall approval rating, a 
computation of several factors external from the war on Iraq, remained over 60 percent 
until February 2004.  It was not until May 2004 that his overall approval dipped below 50 
percent.  The Presidents most dramatic shifts in both his overall approval ratings and 
approval for the war in Iraq came in 2006.  His disapproval rate for handling Iraq had an 
average increase of 5 percent throughout the year and an average increase of 6 percent in 
his disapproval rating overall, compared to 2005.  2006 proves to be a pivotal year for 
public opinion, it’s the first time the majority of Americans clearly and steadily 
disapprove of President Bush’s performance as both President and Commander in Chief.  
From this point on the President’s approval rating overall and in response to his handling 
the situation in Iraq run closely in line with one another.  From this information it can be 
inferred that the American public’s put great weight on the war in Iraq when determining 
their opinion of the President.  During the years 2007–08, the approval averaged a dismal 
31 percent.  The steady decline in President Bush’s approval rating shows how 
American’s will grow war weary in a prolonged conflict, however their desire to keep 
troops in Iraq also shows that the public remains steadfast in the war effort.   
 At the start of the Iraq conflict, 54 percent of Americans were in favor of military 
action against Iraq, with only 28 percent against action.  The remaining 18 percent were 
unsure or hadn’t thought about the idea.  When Americans continued to be polled about 
whether or not it was a mistake to send troops to Iraq, for the first couple years of the 
war, the majority still thought that it was not a mistake to send in troops, despite a 
constant gradual decrease in the approval of the President’s handling the situation in Iraq.  
In summer of 2005, over 50 percent of Americans thought it was a mistake to send troops 
to Iraq and in light of the current situation in Iraq it was not worth going to war over.  In 
2006, the turning point of the Iraq War, close to 60 percent of American’s polled began to 
think that it was a mistake to send troops to Iraq, showing steady growth in disapproval.  
This sentiment persisted and grew in the following year.  2007 was also the year of the 
troop surge.  Two thirds of the public that year thought it was a mistake sending troops to 
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Iraq initially, so they logically would not be in favor of a surge of U.S. forces.  Yet, 
Americans did not call for a complete withdrawal from Iraq. 
 Just five months after the invasion of Iraq, the question regarding what should be 
done about the number of troops in Iraq was polled.  On average, only 15 percent of 
American’s polled wanted a complete withdraw of troops.  Approximately 33 percent 
said to keep it the same and another 30 percent wanted some troops to withdraw.  At this 
stage in the war, Americans were split in their opinions of more, or less, troops in 
country.  In 2004, the number of Americans who wanted to send more troops to Iraq or 
keep the level the same was over 50 percent.  This trend, however, did not continue into 
2005, showing the “rally around the fact” effect diminishing.  Although the majority of 
Americans were no longer in favor of the same number or more troops being in Iraq, the 
clear majority is still to keep the same number or begin to withdraw some troops.  In no 
way was this, an indication that America wanted to pull completely out of Iraq, 
maintaining the same level of persistence as in Vietnam.  Even 2006, which showed a 
drastic decrease in Presidential approval, approval of the war, Americans thinking that 
Iraq was not worth going to war over, did not yield polling results that called for troop 
withdrawal.  Still, the majority of public opinion saw a gradual withdrawal, either in 12 
months time or as long as is needed to turn control back to Iraqis, as the best option for 
U.S. forces.  This response continued into 2007.  Furthermore, the data for the number of 
troops in Iraq and preferred plan for withdrawal shows the American public’s resiliency 
during prolonged conflict.  President Bush’s response to continued support for troops in 
Iraq and declining support of the American public for how he was handling the situation 
in Iraq was a change in policy. 
In response to the loss of American support and in an effort to regain public 
support and show the American people that the lives lost were for a valiant cause, 
President Bush escalated the war in the form of a troop surge.  After he announced the 
surge, Americans still remained skeptical about his handling of the war.  At the beginning 
of 2007, half of Americans thought the surge was making no difference and only 20 
percent thought that it was making the situation better, but by the end of 2007, 40 percent 
of Americans thought that the surge was making the situation better and approximately 
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34 percent thought it was not making a difference.  No facts listed in Table 23, the Iraq 
War Timeline, give reason for the doubling in approval for the surge, in fact, they support 
the converse conclusion.  The year 2007 was the deadliest year for U.S. troops, the Iraqi 
government failed to meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks, majority of Iraqis see a worsening in 
security and Iraqi refugees continued to be displaced.  Perhaps, this marked rally of 
American support can be seen as a support for change, a support of the admittance that a 
new strategy was necessary.  Regardless of the reason the American public decided to 
stand behind their President, one thing is certain and that is that America’s support for 





A. IS PUBLIC OPINION FRAGILE? 
1. Vietnam 
There is a clear point in both Vietnam and Iraq when public opinion “rally around 
the flag” in support of the President during armed conflict.  The focus of this thesis is not 
the “rally around the flag” effect, but what happens after this phenomenon subsides.  
What happens to public opinion?  In Vietnam, the “the rally around the flag” took place 
mid-1965, so data taken from 1966 to 1968 will be evaluated to determine the fragility of 
public opinion.  As stated in Chapter II, anti–war protests increased in 1966, as did the 
number of Americans attuned to the situation in Vietnam.  President Johnson’s overall 
approval rating began at 61 percent and slowly declined to 43 percent by years end.  His 
disapproval surpassed his approval by December 1966, 46 percent to 43 percent.  
Johnson’s approval for the war slowly declined from January 1966 to May 1966 and 
seesawed between each other the rest of the year.  Over half of Americans in late 1966 
still thought the United States did the right thing to send troops to Vietnam.  These are all 
clear indications that public opinion is not fragile during 1966. 
In 1967, President Johnson’s overall approval rating remained higher than his 
disapproval rating until August of 1967.  It was not until December 1967, when his 
approval rating surpassed his disapproval rating to finish the year.  President Johnson’s 
overall approval rating was also higher than his approval for handling the war.  President 
Johnson’s approval for the war in Vietnam was low, and more Americans disapproved of 
his handling throughout the entire year.  However, more Americans thought it was a 
mistake to send troops into Vietnam throughout the year with the exception of July 1967.  
Support for the war in 1967 was low, but most Americans were not willing to give up 
completely on Vietnam.  This shows the beginnings of Americans’ approval for the 
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President, with respect to the war in Vietnam, starting to taper off.  Yet, public support 
for the troops abroad and the United States’ purpose in Vietnam remained steady. 
President Johnson’s overall approval rating seesawed during the first half of 1968, 
and finally his disapproval rating was higher than his approval rating for the rest of his 
Presidency.  His disapproval for the war in Vietnam during 1968 was significantly higher 
than his approval rating.  More Americans thought that it was a mistake to send troops to 
Vietnam throughout the entirety of 1968.  The NES polls taken toward the end of 1968, 
show that most Americans thought we should have stayed out of Vietnam, but in the next 
question asked, over 60 percent of Americans thought we should keep our soldiers there 
and try to end the fighting or take a stronger stand, even if it meant invading North 
Vietnam.  The year 1968 shows the American public was growing weary, but not ready 
to give in just yet.   
Between 1966 and 1968, the American public did not approve of President 
Johnson’s handling of Vietnam and eventually thought it was a mistake to send troops to 
Vietnam, however, when asked what should be done next?  Most Americans were in 
favor of keeping troops on the scene, or stepping up our stance against North Vietnam.  
The data shows that the American public is not fragile with prolonged conflict as alluded 
to earlier.   
2. Iraq 
President Bush achieved his “rally around the flag” effect prior to the invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003.  In doing so, measurement of fragility of the American public will be 
from April 2003 to 2008.  After the invasion of Iraq, President Bush’s overall approval 
rating was near 70 percent and slowly decreased to 49 percent by September 2003, and 
recovered to 62 percent by years end.  President Bush’s approval for his handling of Iraq 
began over 70 percent and began its decline for the year finishing the year at 44 percent.  
In spite of his declining approval, most Americans believed that Iraq was worth going to 
war over.  Though the number dropped during the year, over 61 percent of Americans 
thought Iraq was still worth going to war over.  With declining approval ratings for the 
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President, Americans also wanted to keep the same level of troops in Iraq or begin the 
withdrawal of some troops as 2003 progressed.  These polls demonstrate that there was 
no sign of weakness in the publics will for support of the war. 
In 2004, President Bush continued to suffer a declining overall approval rating 
and approval rating for his handling of Iraq.  By May of 2004, the number of Americans 
who thought Iraq was not worth going to war over surpassed those who thought Iraq was 
worth going to war over, and still Americans seesawed with this question for the rest of 
2004.  Despite these fluctuations in the polls, most Americans did not think it was a 
mistake to send troops to Iraq for most of the year.  Once again, this shows the resiliency 
of the American people.  President Bush’s overall approval fluctuated in 2005, but 
disapproval for handling the war continued to grow as the year progressed and over time, 
most Americans thought it was a mistake to send troops to Iraq.  By April 2005, most 
Americans thought Iraq was not worth going to war over.  At the end of 2005, with 
Americans not liking the situation in Iraq, about one third of Americans wanted to see 
some troop withdrawal, and a quarter of Americans wanted to keep troops at the present 
levels, continuing the desire for Americans not to fold their tents and return home. 
President Bush’s overall approval level declined between 2006 and 2008.  His 
overall disapproval hovered near 60 percent for the remainder of his Presidency.  His 
approval for the war stayed below 40 percent and then fell into the near 30 percent level, 
or below, through 2008.  Most Americans thought it was mistake to send troops to Iraq, 
but thought the withdrawal of U.S. troops should take place in as many years needed, 
until complete control could be turned over to the Iraqis.  Others wanted to take at least a 
year to withdraw troops.  Still, after four years of fighting in Iraq, the American public 
had shown its resiliency in support of prolonged military conflict.  In 2007, the average 
percentage of Americans who wanted an immediate withdrawal was a mere 18 percent.  
Proof that although the majority of Americans thought that it was a mistake to send 
troops into Iraq their idea of resolution was not a complete withdrawal.  Nearly 40 
percent of Americans wanted to withdraw within 12 months, and approximately 30 
percent wanted to withdraw troops in as many years it takes to turn over control to Iraqis.  
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An even stronger indicator of the American publics’ resiliency in response to the 
prolonged war with Iraq is their response regarding the effectiveness of the troop surge in 
2007.  After the initial surge in mid-2007, 30 percent of Americans polled thought that 
the surge was making things better in Iraq and 45 percent did not think that it was either 
helping or hurting, but only 21 percent thought negatively of the increase in troops.  After 
losing many American lives in Iraq in 2007, it may be expected that Americans would 
begin to disapprove of the surge, however steadfast public support is apparent within the 
2008 “Is the troop surge making a difference?” poll statistics 43 percent, a markedly high 
number of Americans thought that the surge was making things better in Iraq.  With a 
presidential approval rating near 30 percent and most Americans feeling Iraq was not 
worth fighting for, the American public showed it was not fragile.  
3. Vietnam vs. Iraq 
There are similarities and differences between the Vietnam and Iraq Wars.  In 
looking at public opinion for each of the conflicts, there are significant differences in the 
timeline for public sentiments.  The American public, although proving to be resilient in 
enduring prolonged conflicts, is not short of memory.  In Vietnam, it took two years after 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, for the “rally around the flag” affect to diminish and for 
the public to start to doubt our purpose in the war.  Conversely, less than 40 years later, 
with many of the public remembering the war in Vietnam, the “rally around the flag” 
affect lasted a mere six months after the initial invasion of Iraq. 
 Another significant difference between public opinion in the two wars was the 
ability for the American public to receive information.  The disparity is made clear with 
the answers to the polling question, “Do you approve of the way the President is handling 
the situation in Vietnam/Iraq?”  Looking a year into the war, so we may assume that the 
public has had sufficient time to become aware of the happenings within the war, the 
amount of people polled who answered “Don’t Know” to the above question in 1965 was 
an average of 20 percent, a strikingly high percentage in comparison to the same question 
in 2004, one year after the Iraq invasion, where the same response was 1.25 percent.  This 
phenomenon may be attributed to the various amounts of media available in 2004, as 
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compared to 1965.  The information age that spawned since the late 1980s has created 
several avenues to receive information.  In contrast, during the Vietnam era, the public 
may have been limited to radio, television, and printed news mediums only. 
 A popular polling question throughout both wars asked the public if they thought 
going to war with Vietnam/Iraq was a mistake.  Two years after the start of both wars, the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for Vietnam and the initial invasion of Iraq, was when the 
majority of the American public started to feel like it indeed was a mistake to enter into 
war.  This seemingly obvious parallel does have a caveat, if you take into consideration 
the “rally around the flag” time periods for each conflict.  In Vietnam, this change in 
public opinion came simultaneously with the end of the “rally round the flag” period.  
With respect to the Iraq War, American support was much more resilient after the “rally 
round the flag” period had ended.  It took the American public one and a half years after 
this point to begin to feel like the invasion may have been a mistake.  In both cases, for 
two years, America on the whole had no reservations about being engaged in armed 
conflict. 
B. DID PUBLIC OPINION SHAPE PRESIDENTIAL POLICY? 
1. Vietnam 
From Chapter II, President Johnson’s reason for escalating the war in Vietnam 
was to contain communism and avert the feared “domino theory” in Southeast Asia.  
“The simplistic Cold War narrative, once constructed to build consensus for the 
containment of Soviet Communism, shaped U.S. policy in Vietnam.”43  President 
Johnson continued to escalate the war and the public supported the escalation.  It was not 
until after the Tet Offensive, that presidential policy shifted.  “Not until the events in 
Vietnam challenged the professed war aims did television coverage begin to reflect the 
public’s growing doubt about the war.”44 A few months after the Tet Offensive, public 
support for escalation began to wane.  “The Domino Theory, which explained that 
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Americans must fight Communism in Vietnam, so they would not have to fight them at 
home turned out to be wrong nor did the assumption hold that a show of American 
military would persuade Vietnamese Communist to back down.”45  Not only did 
President Johnson realize the North Vietnamese were not going to succumb to the U.S., 
but funding the war was becoming too great for the President.   
McNamara’s successor, Clark Clifford, learned from civilian analysts at 
the Pentagon that under the current strategy 200,000 more troops would 
not change Hanoi’s determination to fight or inspire the South Vietnamese 
government to defend itself.  For LBJ, the worst blow was when the Wise 
Men counseled disengagement.  After all, Acheson and others had defined 
the conflict in Vietnam as a crucial stand against communism.  Now they 
concluded that the United States could not achieve victory nor could it 
afford to fight much longer.  The war, at a cost of two billion dollars a 
month contributed to inflation and a growing federal deficit.46 
On March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced he would not seek re–election.  
This would be the ultimate policy shift for his administration.  He realized that the U.S. 
would not win the war.  “From President Johnson’s point of view, the most damaging 
report came from Cronkite who returned from a tour of South Vietnam to announce on 
national TV that ‘we are mired in stalemate’ and ‘the only rational way out would be to 
negotiate – not as victims, but as an honorable people who …did the best they could.’”47 
2. Iraq 
In Chapter III, President Bush’s primary reasons for invading Iraq were links to 
al–Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction.  Both reasons to go to war were later proven 
to be inaccurate.  “But on September 18, President Bush conceded: ‘No, we’ve had no 
evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th.’ He gave no 
explanation as to why the previously implied connection was abandoned.”48  For the 
premise of weapons of mass destruction, “Claims about chemical and biological weapons 
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were based on legitimate evidence that was widely accepted internationally, despite the 
failure to find the weapons by late 2003.”49  Even after the links of al–Qaeda and Saddam 
Hussein were found untrue as well as Saddam Hussein not having weapons of mass 
destruction, the U.S. was already in Iraq.  Since both reasons were found untrue, the Bush 
administration began to focus on how bad Saddam Hussein was as a leader and person.  
“They preferred to focus on Saddam Hussein’s brutality.  Of that there was plenty of 
evidence in mass graves and mourning families.”50   
President Bush still wanted to transform Iraq into a democratic ally as stated in 
Chapter III, but the Iraqi people looked at U.S. forces as an occupational force.  The Bush 
administration envisioned U.S. forces being greeted with open arms as liberators as we 
began our invasion.   
To those who said an invasion would destabilize the region and interfere 
with the war on terrorism, Cheney rejoined: ‘the opposite is 
true…extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of 
jihad.  Moderates...would take heart, and our ability to advance the Israeli–
Palestinian peace process would be enhanced.’  Officials predicted that the 
Iraqis would welcome the U.S. military’s liberators.51 
The opposite occurred, and internal strife began according to the Iraq timeline.  
The insurgency began the summer of 2003, first targeting Americans then progressing to 
Iraqi on Iraqi violence.  U.S. forces would be forced to continue to deal with this 
insurgency for the next several years.  “ The Iraqi insurgency bombed, kidnapped, and 
executed American military personnel and civilians, U.N. officials, coalition partners, 
and Iraqis who worked with Americans or belonged to rival religious sects or ethnic 
groups.”52   
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3. Vietnam vs. Iraq 
Public opinion was influential in the presidential policy during both war periods.  
However, the influence of the public did manifest itself in very different ways for 
Presidents Johnson and Bush.  President Johnson responded to a decline in public 
approval by choosing not to seek re–election.  President Bush, during his second term as 
President, was aware of the diminishing public approval of his handling of the war in 
Iraq.  Prior to his resignation, in late 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, 
“the current strategy in Iraq was not working.  He suggested that the administration 
should not “lose,” but recast the way it talked about the U.S. mission.”53  In response, 
President Bush adjusted his approach to the Iraq War.  This adjustment yielded the troop 
surge in 2007.   
 A change in presidential policy occurred within both conflicts.  After the Tet 
Offensive and listening to Walter Cronkite’s reports on Vietnam, President Johnson 
spoke to his Press Secretary, George Christian and said, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost 
the country.”54  Acknowledging this, 2.5 years after the “rally around the flag,” President 
Johnson shifted his presidential policy towards Vietnam, by not running for re–election.  
Clearly showing public opinion does affect presidential policy.  On the contrary, 
President Bush waited until late 2006 early 2007, with an approval for handling Iraq at 30 
percent and an overall approval at 36 percent, coupled with the resignation of his 
Secretary of Defense and a staunch Democratic Congress, to shift his strategy in Iraq.  
This shift in strategy occurs four years after the “rally around the flag” effect diminished.  
These two Presidents during each of their conflicts responded differently.  President 
Johnson reacted quicker in response to public opinion than President Bush, who was 
more inflexible in his policy regarding Iraq. 
 
                                                 
53 Brewer, 270. 




The data from the Gallup Polls and American National Election Studies show that 
the public’s opinion is not as malleable as scholars, government officials, and politicians 
believe during prolonged military conflict.  The question of fragility of the American 
public should not just be viewed as a singular opinion of approval or disapproval.  After 
analyzing the data it appears that this question is two–pronged.  In both wars, public 
support for the President began to taper off when the war did not appear to be going in 
the direction the American public desired.  Yet, even with the disapproval for the way the 
President was handling the situation in Vietnam, or Iraq, public opinion still suggested 
that we stay and finish what we started.  In some polls, the public was even for sending 
more troops into combat.  This suggests that public opinion is not so malleable when it 
comes to standing behind the President and his policy.  It further suggests that public 
opinion is not soft and will stand behind America, regardless of a perception of 
“winning” or “losing” of the war.  
 Public opinion and its affect on presidential policy, reflects clear distinctions 
between the two wars.  President Johnson was aware of the growing national debt during 
the war and his inability to win the war in Vietnam; he decided to not seek re–election.  
Meanwhile, President Bush was re–elected in 2004 and he continued his “stay the 
course” policy until the last year of his Presidency.  The changes in presidential policy, 
due to public opinion, become clear when analyzing the data along with Presidential 
action.  President Johnson thought he lost American support and his response to this was 
to not seek re–election.  “The Tet Offensive, the replacement of General Westmoreland, 
President Johnson’s decision not to run again and his partial bombing halt, [and] the 
opening of preliminary peace talks,”55 were all changes in his policy in response to the 
American’s disapproval of his handling of the war.  His ultimate response was to not seek 
re–election. 
                                                 
55 Brewer, 57. 
92 
 
 President Bush showed change in his policy in response to the declining approval 
of the American public.  At the end of 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
resigned.  At this point Bush’s approval rating for handling the situation in Iraq was at 30 
percent and his overall approval rating was around 37 percent.  With this type of 
disapproval and the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld, President Bush took action in a 
direction very different than what was seen in the previous two years.  At the beginning 
of 2007, President Bush announced a troop surge in Iraq.  Along with the surge in 2007, 
Americans saw the deadliest year for troops in Iraq.  By mid-2007, the changes that 
President Bush made to his policy with the Iraq War yielded him an approval rating of 
only 28 percent, for both his handling of the situation in Iraq and his overall presidential 
approval. 
Events happening domestically did not figure into the area of study.  President 
Johnson was dealing with the civil rights movement and other national movements.  
President Bush faced an already existing war in Afghanistan and attempted to link the 
two wars together.  These factors should be looked at in further research.  Additionally, 
evaluating the role the media played, and plays, in prolonged conflict should be studied 
along with the relationship and influence the media provides for affecting presidential 
policy and public opinion.  Future research may also include Afghanistan in this analysis 
of Vietnam and Iraq about the effect of public opinion with respect to prolonged conflicts 
and the apparent fragility of American support for war.  An additional topic of research 
on Afghanistan could use the data studied in this thesis and by association determine 
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